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trial court manifestly abused its authority. The court reasoned that
O'Neill had a full and fair opportunity to oppose the water court's jurisdiction in O'Neill I, and on appeal of that case, but failed to do so.
The court further ruled that the subject claim was substantially vexatious, and therefore, the State Engineer was entitled to attorney's fees
for defending the appeal.
David A. Laird

CONNECTICUT
Hartt v. Schwartz, No. CV 920331912S, 1997 WL 625467, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 1997) (holding that a conveyance of property,
which housed a dry cleaning operation from 1967 to 1978, was subject
to Connecticut's Hazardous Waste Transfer Act).
In 1986, the Hartts purchased property from Schwartz. The property housed a dry cleaning operation from 1967 to 1978. The Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") then notified the Hartts that contamination from the old dry cleaning
operation had migrated off-site. The Hartts were ordered to clean up
the waste.
The Hartts sued Schwartz. They claimed Schwartz was responsible
for disclosing the condition of the property, according to the Connecticut Hazardous Waste Transfer Act. Schwartz moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the property transfer was only subject to the
1985 version and not the 1987 amendment to the Act. The summary
judgment motion was examined and ruled on by the superior court.
The court held that "the 1987 amendment should be applied retroactively and that summary judgment should therefore not be
granted." Additionally, it was noted that the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA") "appears to contemplate the possibility of a suit by a private citizen against an entity other than the state for
the consequences of past pollution." Therefore, the Hartts could
bring suit against Schwartz for past pollution.
The court perused the language of the amendment, as well as legislative intent and history in reaching its decision. It observed that the
amendment clearly directed transferors of property to include all operations since 1967 which may have generated waste, and that dry
cleaning operations were plainly included in the amendment. Likewise, the legislative intent, as asserted in the state's code, indicated that
there was a "public interest to provide all persons with an adequate
remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution.... ." The court pointed out that the Director of
the DEP Hazardous Waste Unit testified at legislative hearings that the
amendment was meant to clarify a loophole, ensuring that dry cleaning operations were included within the Act's scope. The testimony
also indicated that the inclusion of the May 1967 date was designed to
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clarify existing law, not to change a substantive change law.
Based on these investigations, the court found that public policy
required that the amendment operate retroactively. Thus, Schwartz'
conveyance was subject to the Transfer Act and summary judgment
was denied.
In addition, the court noted that the language of CEPA only precluded an action against the state for pollution that occurred prior to a
conveyance of property. Thus, it followed that an action against an individual or other entity based on prior contamination was not prohibited.
StephaniePickens

GEORGIA
Givens v. Ichauway, Inc., 493 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 1997) (holding that the
appellant failed to present admissible evidence demonstrating navigability and, therefore, prosecution for trespassing was appropriate).
Ichauway, Inc. sued to enjoin Givens from floating down Ichauwaynochaway Creek through its property. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Ichauway. On appeal, Givens asserted
he had presented sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact as to the stream's navigability. The Supreme Court of Georgia
held that Givens failed to establish the creek's navigability and that
Ichauway, therefore, had the fight to exclude the public-a right creating legally tenable grounds to charge Givens with criminal trespass.
In Georgia, the statutory definition of navigable creek is one that is
"capable of transporting boats loaded with freight in the regular
course of trade ...." The mere rafting of timber or the transporting

of wood in small boats shall not make a stream navigable." Although
Givens attempted to demonstrate the creek's navigability in a number
of different ways (among others, Givens built a raft of styrofoam and
wood, loaded it with a goat, a bale of cotton, and two passengers, and
floated it through Ichauway's leasehold), the court rejected his arguments stating that he failed to present evidence showing the creek's
navigability under the state's statutory definition.
Alternatively, Givens argued that an 1894 Georgia case, Young v.
Harrison,defined three different types of rivers in the state: (1) those
which are wholly private property; (2) those which are "private property subject to the servitude of the public interest, by a passage upon
them"; and (3) those subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. Givens
contended that the Young court's language supported a common law
right of passage as an alternative to the state's statutory definition. The
court stated that the legislature had codified the Young decision in the
statutory definition of a navigable creek and that a court could not interpret the language of Young to extend a right of passage to streams
not found to be navigable under the statute.

